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The forced transportation of over 12.5m Africans to the New World between the sixteenth 
and nineteenth centuries was „one of history‟s greatest crimes against humanity‟.2 It reached 
its peak in the late eighteenth century, by which time Britain had established itself as the 
leading slaver nation, carrying 40 per cent (1.6m) of all Africans transported between 1761 
and the abolition of the British trade in1807.
3
 The classic triangular pattern of the trade 
encompassed three legs: the outward voyage from a British or European port to the western 
coast of Africa where captives were purchased and loaded, the infamous „middle passage‟ 
from Africa to the Americas, and the voyage homeward to Europe. Rising real prices for 
sugar and slaves, improvements in the productivity of plantation labor, together with high 
attrition rates among existing slave populations and newly arrived captives, led to a growing 
demand from the Americas, so that the average number of Africans transported rose from 
                                                          
 Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Universities of Nottingham and Umeå. 
We are most grateful to the participants, as well as to the Editor of this JOURNAL and to two 
anonymous referees, for their insightful comments. 
2
  Davis, “Foreword”, p. xvii. 
3
  The other major trading nations were Portugal/Brazil, who carried 32 per cent of 
captives transported between 1761 and 1807, and France (17 per cent). The most important of 
the minor participants were American and Dutch ships (six and three per cent respectively). 
Calculated from www.slavevoyages.org, accessed 4 November 2017. 
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around 20,000 a year in the late seventeenth century to over 80,000 a year in the period 1781-
1810.
4
  
A critical factor enabling the transatlantic slave trade to grow to such dimensions was 
the ability of the merchants to find ways to mitigate not only the usual risks of trans-oceanic 
commerce in a pre-industrial age, but also those risks peculiar to the trade itself. The latter 
included high crew and slave morbidity rates, highly variable loading rates and ocean 
crossing times and the difficulties of provisioning for these, the moral hazard of crew 
neglecting their cargoes or trading for themselves, losses caused through shipboard slave 
revolt or resistance, and a variety of transaction risks, including exchange value uncertainties, 
price volatility and planter credit default in the purchase of new slaves. Historians have noted 
how failure to manage such risks undermined the trading capacities of some companies 
involved in the slaving business.
5
  
It is evident, nonetheless, that a wide range of measures was employed to try to 
mitigate or manage these risks. Some of these are discussed further below. Our primary focus 
in this paper, however, is on one important risk mitigation device largely neglected by 
historians, namely the insurance of ships and goods on all legs of the trade, and their human 
cargoes on the middle passage.
6
 The insurance of slaves at sea was already known in the 
                                                          
4
  Eltis, Lewis and Richardson, “Slave Prices”.  
5
  Carlos, “Bonding”.  
6
  There is no mention of insurance in, for instance, Klein, Atlantic Slave Trade; Curtin, 
Atlantic Slave Trade; Haggerty, “Risk and Risk Management”, and only brief references in 
the principal studies of the French, Dutch and Portuguese/Brazilian trades. Stein, French 
Slave Trade; Postma, Dutch Slave Trade; Miller, Way of Death. The exception is Inikori, 
Africans, discussed below.  
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fifteenth-century Mediterranean, where small numbers were occasionally included in policies 
covering maritime cargoes.
7
 From the late seventeenth century onward the expansion of 
transatlantic commerce raised it to an entirely new level. The annual average number of 
slaves carried by British ships in the first half of the eighteenth century rose by 68 per cent, a 
faster increase than that of shipping tonnage and probably Atlantic trade in general.
8
 
Moreover, insurance was becoming increasingly available. By the 1720s London insurers 
included the slave trade among so-called “cross risks,” that is ships or cargoes travelling 
between two or more foreign destinations outside the United Kingdom. In 1731 as much as 
42 per cent of marine insurances sold by the London Assurance Corporation were “cross 
risks”. For private underwriters the percentage was probably higher, especially when the two 
London insurance corporations withdrew from the cross-risks market during wartime.
9
 We do 
not know precisely what proportion of cross-risks insurance was accounted for by the slave 
trade, but given the relative rates of expansion noted above, it is probable that it became more 
important as a source of revenue for insurers (discussed further below). Of the 74 slaving 
                                                          
7
  Del Treppo, “Assicurazioni ”.  
8
  On average per annum 151,877 slaves embarked 1701-10, and 255,346 in 1751-60. 
Calculated from www.slavevoyages.org (accessed 4.11.2017). English shipping tonnage was 
323,000 in 1702 and 421,000 in 1751, a 30 per cent growth. Combined trade with Africa, the 
Americas and the West Indies (average annual imports, exports plus re-exports at official 
values) rose from £2.2m to £3.4m between 1710-19 and 1751-8, a 54 per cent growth albeit 
for a shorter period. Calculated from Mitchell, British Historical Statistics, pp.448, 534. 
9
  Calculated from John, “London Assurance”, table 1. The cross-risks proportion of 
London Assurance business varied considerably. It was 17 per cent in 1769-70. See also 
Cockerell and Green, British Insurance, p. 12.  
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voyages operated by the Liverpool trader William Davenport between 1757 and 1784 for 
which accounts survive, all were insured. All of the 55 slaving voyages of James Rogers of 
Bristol in1784-1793 for which we have accounts carried insurance. From his study of 
Davenport‟s accounts, Richardson concluded “there is little doubt…that mid-eighteenth-
century slave-traders regularly insured their ventures.”10  
The insurance of transatlantic slave voyages, however, has seldom been examined as 
a business. Cultural and legal historians have debated the meaning of insured slaves as human 
lives or property.
11
 The only macroeconomic analysis was by Inikori, who argued that the 
growth of British marine insurance was largely dependent on insuring slaving and its related 
trades.
12
  Little attention has been paid to the practice of insuring slave ships, and to the 
impact of insurance on the trade. This article represents the first attempt to examine the 
process and implications of underwriting transatlantic slave voyages. What were the risks, 
how were they assessed and priced, and why were they underwritten? What was the cost 
burden of insurance to merchants? To what extent were slave voyages self-insured or 
underinsured?  Our primary focus is on the role that insurance played in the British slave 
trade. Comparisons are also drawn where possible to the transatlantic slave trades of other 
nations, but because of the current paucity of published information, a comprehensive 
examination of the role of insurance in these trades will have to await future research.
13
  
                                                          
10
  Richardson, “Profits”, p.71.  
11
  Armstrong, “Slavery”; Rupprecht, “Excessive Memories”; Rupprecht,  “Uncommon 
Case”; Oldham, “Insurance Litigation”.  
12
  Inikori, Africans, pp. 338-61. 
13
  See note 6 above. 
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Very few individual policies insuring British slaving voyages have survived.  
Consequently, any analysis is dependent on other sources, notably merchants‟ records of the 
insurance they purchased, or, more rarely, brokers‟ underwriting books. Our analysis is based 
on a new dataset comprising the latter two types of source. The first consists of details of 69 
insurance policies issued to the Bristol merchant James Rogers for 55 slaving voyages 
between 1784 and 1793 and recorded in his papers in the Chancery Masters Exhibits of the 
British National Archives. The details include the policy‟s date and place of issue, name of 
ship and its captain, route insured, amount insured, categories of property insured (ship, 
goods etc), premium rate paid, cost of policy, valuation of „negroes per head‟ (recorded in 13 
policies only), amounts covered by individual subscribers (underwriters) to the insurance and 
their names (28 policies), and notes on the terms and restrictions of the cover (23 policies), 
such as „liberty to join convoy‟ or „free from the loss by trading in boats‟, the last referring to 
the practice in parts of western Africa of using yawls or other small craft to barter for and 
carry slaves to the principal vessel. We have cross checked and expanded the information on 
these 69 insurances by linking them to their respective voyages in Richardson‟s gazetteer of 
Bristol slaving voyages which gives the value and composition of outlays and the dates of 
departure and return to Bristol.
14
 Our second source comprises the six underwriting books of 
Abraham Clibborn, which provide details of 330 insurance policies issued on slave ships, 
mostly departing from Bristol, between 1769 and 1775.
15
 Clibborn listed policies by the name 
of the firm broking the insurance rather than by individual voyage or ship‟s name. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to reorganise the entries and extract the following information: 
issue date of policy (month and year only), broker‟s name, ship‟s name, amount insured, 
                                                          
14
  Richardson, Bristol. 
15
  The National Archives, UK (TNA), C107/1-15, Chancery Masters Exhibits, James 
Rogers Papers; C107/11, Underwriting Books of Abraham Clibborn. 
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premium rate paid, categories of property insured (ship, goods etc), route insured, fate of 
voyage. Supplementary data on the voyages insured – date of departure, destinations, value 
and composition of outlay – have also been gleaned from Richardson‟s gazetteer. Because 
cargoes and hulls on some voyages were insured in more than one policy, the 399 policies 
across our two sources covered an estimated 220 voyages. We believe that this is the largest 
dataset ever compiled for slave trade insurance.
16
  
There is no reason to suspect that the information in these sources is inaccurate in any 
systematic way. They were compiled for private consumption only, their usefulness to their 
owners lay in their accuracy and there were no major incentives to falsify the records.
17
 
                                                          
16
  Inikori‟s appendix 7.2 contains insurance premiums for 60 voyages 1757-1806. His 
table 7.2 of insurance rates 1701-1807 does not specify the number of observations. Inikori, 
Africans, pp. 350, 510-11. Our definition of a voyage is determined by the contemporary 
insurance. Thus England to Africa to America, if insured in one policy, is counted as one 
voyage. Where two or more insurances are recorded for the same ship and same route and are 
dated within six months of each other, we assume that the policies cover the same voyage. A 
small number of time policies (10) recorded in the Clibborn books, where no route is 
specified, are counted as insuring one voyage each.  
17
  Legislation passed in 1788 (28 Geo. III c.54) stipulated heavy fines for British ships 
exceeding the loading limit of slaves per ton, but this regulation is said by some to have been 
widely ignored. Inikori, Africans, pp.246-7, 284-5. In any case our study does not draw on 
the types of records - log books and surgeons‟ journals - that were subject to inspection under 
these rules. Nor was taxation an incentive to falsify in our period. A flat sixpence stamp duty 
on insurance policies was first introduced by 5 William & Mary (1694) c.21. From 10 Anne 
(1711) c.26 only stamped policies were valid in the English law of equity, so policyholders 
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Moreover, to supplement and expand the information on the policies, a detailed study has 
been carried out of the extensive correspondence concerning many of these voyages found in 
the Rogers‟ papers.18  
As well as analysing the business of underwriting slave voyages, we have two other 
objectives. First, we explore the meaning of slave insurance from the perspective of those 
directly involved in the trade. Was it about insuring lives or goods? Second, we provide new 
estimates of the importance of the slave trade to UK marine insurance. Did the former drive 
the growth of the latter, as Inikori claimed?  We begin by exploring these issues.  
SLAVES AS CARGO: INSURING LIVES OR GOODS? 
On 29 November 1781 the master of the Zong, a Liverpool slaver becalmed in the 
doldrums and running out of provisions, threw 132 living slaves overboard on the assumption 
that insurance would cover the loss. When the underwriters refused the claim the owners 
successfully sued. The underwriters applied for a retrial. At the Kings Bench in May 1783 
Lord Mansfield and his fellow judges ruled in favour of the applicants, finding that there was 
no evidence that the loss had been occasioned by “perils of the sea” covered by the standard 
marine insurance policy.
19
 Two years later Mansfield adjudicated another case, where a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
had an incentive to pay the duty. The first proportionate tax on amounts insured - 2s.6d per 
£100 insured (0.125 per cent) - was levied in 1795 by 35 Geo. III c.63. According to 
contemporaries this was widely evaded, but it was introduced two years after the last policies 
in our dataset were issued. On marine insurance taxation, see Park, Law of Marine 
Insurances, p.28; Walford, Insurance Cyclopedia, vol.3, pp.552-3.  
18
  See note 15 above. 
19
  Gregson v Gilbert (1783) 3 Doug KB 232; 99 ER 629, discussed in Clark, “Slave‟s 
Appeal”; Oldham, “Insurance Litigation”; Walvin, Zong. The standard SG (ship, goods) 
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Bristol ship had lost 55 slaves during a revolt off the coast of Africa. The dispute centred on 
which losses the underwriters were liable for under the slave insurrection clause in the policy. 
The court ruled that they were to compensate for slaves shot dead or who died from wounds 
incurred directly in the struggle, but that they were not liable for deaths by other means, such 
as drowning, jumping overboard or “abstinence” from despair at the failure of the uprising.20  
In the aftermath of these and other cases, both legislators and the courts wrestled with 
the problem of how to define more precisely the “perils of the sea” as contained in the 
standard Lloyd‟s policy and restated in the Dolben Act of 1788, the first major British 
regulation of slave shipping.
21
 Legal ambiguities persisted. In 1794, breaking from standard 
policy conditions, parliament prohibited the recovery of slave losses due to jettison or as a 
result of quarrels with rulers on the African coast that derived from aggressive procurement 
by British crews.
22
 At the same time, however, the standard underwriters‟ exemption from 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
policy insured a hull and/or cargo against the “perils of the seas, men-of-war, fire, enemies, 
pirates, rovers, thieves, jettisons, letters of mart and countermart, surprisals, takings at sea, 
arrests, restraints, and detainment of all kings, princes and people”. Perils of the sea included 
loss or damage by shipwreck, stranding, burning or sinking, and loss damage or loss 
deliberately caused by master or crew. Cockerell and Green, British Insurance, pp.3-4.  
20
  Jones v Schmoll (1785) 1 Term Rep 130n, discussed in Park, System, pp. 56-7; 
Oldham, “Insurance Litigation”, pp. 308-10. 
21
  28 Geo III (1788) c. 54, art. 12 prohibited insurance of “any Cargo of Slaves, or any 
Part thereof”, except against “the Perils of the Sea, Piracy, Insurrection, or Capture by the 
King‟s Enemies, Barratry of the Master and Crew, and Destruction by Fire.” See also 30 Geo. 
III (1790) c.33; 32 Geo. III (1792) c.52; 33 Geo. III (1793) c.73.  
22
  34 Geo III (1794) c.80, art. 10; 39 Geo. III (1799) c.80. 
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liability for losses through natural death, wastage, spoilage, was confirmed in Tatham v 
Hodgson (1796), where the court included within the definition of “natural death” the 
starvation of slaves by insufficient provisions occasioned by delays in a voyage due to bad 
weather or poor seamanship.
23
 The insurance of slaves was finally made illegal in 1807 by 
the same act that abolished the British slave trade, although some underwriters continued to 
insure slavers sailing under foreign flags.
24
  
The Zong trial and other legal cases and atrocity stories became milestones in the 
campaign for abolition. Abolitionists protested that the slave trade wrongly conflated goods 
and persons. The Zong‟s crew, they argued, should be tried for murder. Shipboard revolts 
demonstrated the human desire of African slaves for liberty, rendering them something more 
than insurable cargo. Scholars have taken up these ideas and argued, largely from legal and 
abolitionist texts, that the status of the insured slave occupied “a middle position in the 
progress from insurance on goods to insurance on persons, providing a way of thinking about 
the value of a life.”25 When slaves used their agency through suicide, revolt or other 
resistance, “insurance law struggled to know how to respond...”26 Insurance cases, and the 
abolitionist commentaries that accompanied them, “dramatised the consequences of legal 
perversion in the name of profit”, so that “even the most hardened slavers tacitly 
acknowledged the ...irreducible humanity of a so-called human cargo.”27   
                                                          
23
  Tatham v Hodgson (1796) 6 Term Rep 656, 101 ER 756; Park, System, pp. 62, 495; 
Oldham, “Insurance Litigation”. 
24
  47 Geo.III c.36 §5. See also 46 Geo III c.52 §6; 51 Geo III c.23 §12. 
25
  Armstrong, “Slavery”, p. 170. Swaminathan, “Reporting Atrocities”. 
26
  Webster, “Zong”, p. 296. 
27
  Rupprecht, “Uncommon Case”, p. 334; Rupprecht, “Limited Sort”.  
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While the horrors of the middle passage may indeed have advanced the case for 
abolition, the focus on the latter has given rise to several misconceptions about how the trade 
regarded slaves and their insurance. Among the extensive private accounts and 
correspondence of merchants, factors, ships‟ captains and surgeons that we have examined, 
there is not a hint that slaves were regarded by those involved in the business as anything 
other than a cargo of goods. In the papers of James Rogers covering 1784-93, the very decade 
in which the general recognition of the humanity of slaves is supposed to have occurred, the 
most frequent term in the trade for a slave cargo was “parcel”. The real value of a “parcel” 
was determined by the ethnicity, size, height, age, gender, state of health and physical 
appearance of the slaves comprising the “parcel” at the time of sale, together with the 
arithmetic of external factors in the market concerned, primarily the supply of and demand 
for slaves, the state of the sugar crop, and the state of planters‟ credit at the time of a ship‟s 
arrival, minus the cost of purchase on the African coast and the cost of provisions on the 
middle passage.
28
 There were similarities with the common Dutch and French methods of 
quantifying slave cargoes as piezas de India (PI), by which an adult male aged 15 to 35, and 
„without major blemish…good in health, not blind, lame, or broken‟ was counted as one PI, 
while women and children were counted as various fractions of one.
29
 
Underwriters and their clients uniformly classified slaves as perishable goods. In his 
1781 digest of English insurance laws and practices John Weskett placed slaves alongside 
cattle as class II common hazards.
30
 The association of slave and livestock cargoes continued 
                                                          
28
  Clark, “Slave‟s Appeal”, also cites the slang term “logs” for British slave cargoes.  
29
  Postma, Dutch Slave Trade, 37-8, 228-9; Stein, French Slave Trade, 85. 
30
  Weskett, Digest, p. 105. The categories were “least hazardous”, “common 
hazardous”, “more hazardous” and “most hazardous”. 
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to be made by English courts long after abolition.
31
 It was also found in maritime codes and 
trading practices elsewhere in Europe. The principal compilation of Portuguese commercial 
law and practice “bluntly headed its chapter regarding insurance for cargoes at sea as „marine 
insurance for slaves and beasts‟.”32 Article 44 of the French Code Noir declared slaves to be 
“moveable stock” (meubles) and therefore a legitimate object of marine insurance.33 The 
Dutch used the word kop (head) for individual slaves, the same term used for cattle.
34
  
 In most maritime codes, perishable goods, as well as goods of high value or strategic 
worth, had to be described and have their value specified in the policy as a means of reducing 
the opportunity for fraud.
 35
 This stipulation was important because, as noted above, insurers 
commonly were not held liable for “natural deaths” or “natural wastage”, “corruption” or 
“spoilage” (including sickness) of perishable goods. On the other hand, they were liable for 
damage and losses through “perils of the sea”, including goods jettisoned to save a ship in 
trouble and losses incurred in putting down shipboard revolts that could justifiably be said to 
endanger ship and crew. Thus it was important for loss adjusters to be able to distinguish 
between these two types of indemnifiable and non-indemnifiable losses in the event of a 
claim.  
                                                          
31
  Cf. Lawrence v Aberdein (1821), 106 ER 1133. 
32
  Miller, Way of Death, p. 394. 
33
  Émerigon, Traité, p. 208. 
34
  Postma, Dutch Slave Trade, 227. Dehumanizing terms were also applied by Dutch 
and French slavers to elderly, sickly, disabled or very young captives who remained unsold, 
namely “macrons” or manquerons” (Dutch), and “queues de cargaison” (French). Postma, 
Dutch Slave Trade, 229; Geggus, “French slave trade”, 127. 
35
  Weskett, Digest, p.261.  
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The “natural deaths” exemption clause had a long history. It was found in the policies 
of fifteenth-century Catalan merchants and in the French maritime ordinance of 1681.
36
 
French legal commentators agreed that when “animals or negroes” died a “natural death”, or 
also where slaves committed suicide through despair, the insurer was not to be held liable.
37
 
Similarly in the Brazilian trade slavers could not insure their cargoes against common 
mortality, hence the practice of killing the first slaves to show any signs of a disease feared to 
be contagious, to save the costs of mortality among the remainder.
38
  
 As we have seen, for those arguing for a post-Zong transition in attitudes towards 
slave cargoes, the question of insurance losses during shipboard revolts is central. Armstrong, 
for example, has claimed that slaves were distinguishable from other goods by the “general 
average sacrifice” clause routinely inserted into slave ship policies.39 This exempted insurers 
from liability from claims arising from shipboard insurrection if the losses amounted to less 
than ten per cent of the total value of the cargo, hull and outfit. The argument was that the 
application of general average to slaves lost in insurrection imbued them in the eyes of 
underwriters with human agency. General average, however, was merely an accounting 
device to facilitate the adjustment of losses on certain goods as an average on the value of the 
ship and all cargo. It was widely applied to other perishable goods, including cattle and 
                                                          
36
  Del Treppo, “Assicurazioni ”, p.23; Weskett, Digest, pp.260-1. There were similar 
clauses in the maritime ordinances of Prussia, Hamburg, Sweden and Florence. 
37
  Valin, Nouveau, vol.2, p.55; Émerigon, Traité, pp. 208-9.  
38
  Miller, Way of Death, p.661. 
39
  Armstrong, “Slavery”, pp.170-5. See also Webster, “Zong”, p.291. 
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horses, in the same measure and with the same level of excess of ten per cent.
40
 “Sacrifice” 
was understood by those involved in the trade not as a reference to the loss of lives, but to the 
sharing of the loss of a perishable cargo among the insured. Underwriters used the general 
average clause with its proportionate excess to hedge against small and pernicious claims on 
all types of cargo losses. Slaves were no exception. Underwriters and courts dealt with slave 
losses arising from shipboard revolt as the equivalent of damage and losses caused by 
livestock panicking during a tempest.
41
 Indeed in the Zong hearing Mansfield described the 
jettison of slaves as similar to the jettison or shooting of horses in a storm to save a ship. The 
problem for the Zong‟s owners was that the court found no evidence that the jettison was 
justified by any perils of the sea. Instead it was the master‟s negligence and seamanship that 
was deemed at fault, and thus there was sufficient doubt that insured losses were not 
recoverable to warrant a retrial.
42
  
 Those arguing that transatlantic slave cargoes were positioned somewhere between 
the insurance of lives and goods have also turned to French evidence suggesting that slaves 
were insured under ransom insurance policies as fictional “captives”, as a means of 
                                                          
40
  Weskett, Digest, p.263, citing the 1744 Ordinance of Amsterdam. The same clause 
was in the Rotterdam Ordinance of 1721. Magens, Essay, vol.2 p.95. Some general average 
clauses fixed the excess at five per cent.  
41
  Lawrence v Aberdein (1821), 106 ER 1133; Gabay v Lloyd (1825), 3 B&C 793, 107 
ER 927. 
42
  Oldham, “Insurance Litigation”, p.316; Clark, “Slave‟s Appeal”, pp.56-7; Lobban, 
“Slavery”.  
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circumventing the prohibition on insuring human lives.
43
 According to this fiction, insurance 
on slaves was to cover the risk of loss of the “ransom money” paid for them upon loading 
until the money was redeemed through their sale across the Atlantic. A related fiction was 
that slaves were captured “enemies” and therefore a peril of the sea and a legitimate object of 
maritime insurance. In his 1783 treatise Émerigon cited ancient sources that argued there was 
always a state of war between masters and slaves. Thus, when insurers underwrote a ship 
known to be in the slave trade, they knew it was taking on board “enemies” that would, if 
they could, cause the loss of the ship.
44
  
This fiction of slaves as the object of ransom insurance appears, however, to be 
entirely derived from French legal and commercial commentaries.
45
 The ransom insurance 
described in other European maritime ordinances only referred to insurance against the loss 
of liberty of European crews, rather than their lives, if captured by Turks, Moors, Corsairs or 
Barbary Pirates.
46
 The French sources are in any case ambiguous. Émerigon also cites a 
Marseille admiralty case from 1776 that makes it clear that French courts regarded slaves as 
goods, without any reference to ransom or redemption (rachat) insurance.
47
 Exactly how 
                                                          
43
  Armstrong, “Slavery”, p.170. Insurance on lives was widely banned as a form of 
gambling that offended religious authorities, beginning with the Ordinances of Barcelona 
(1435) followed by similar prohibitions in the Netherlands, Italy, Sweden and France in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Roover, “Marine Insurance”; Clark, Betting, pp. 13-16. 
44
   “La révolte des Negres est donc une fortune de mer.” Émerigon, Traité, p.397.  
45
  Weskett, Digest, p.72; Valin, Nouveau, vol.2 p.55. 
46
  Cf. the Insurance Ordinances of Hamburg 1731 (article 10), Amsterdam 1744 (article 
14) and Sweden 1750 (article 9): Magens, Essay, vol.2 pp. 225-7, 132-3, 259-310.  
47
  Émerigon, Traité, pp.199-205, 396.  
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underwriters and their clients in France and elsewhere in Europe classified slave cargoes in 
practice, however, would require a close examination of individual merchant‟s records and 
underwriter‟s books, the sort of analysis that we have carried out for English slavers, but 
which for the slave trades of other European nations is beyond the scope of this article.  
 
THE SLAVE TRADE AND BRITISH MARINE INSURANCE 
Inikori was the first historian to attempt to measure the importance of the slave trade 
and the “Atlantic slave economy” to British marine insurance. It formed part of his broader 
argument about the importance of the trade to the British industrial revolution.
48
 He defined 
three channels by which the “Atlantic slave economy” was linked to the insurance industry: 
premiums earned from insuring British slave voyages in the triangular trade; premiums 
earned from insuring the trade in slave-produced commodities between England and 
America, and on the re-export trade in American produce between Britain and Europe; and 
premiums from insuring in London the American trade of European powers. The latter, 
Inikori declared, was impossible to measure given the limited data. He estimated, however, 
that in the 1790s the first two channels - slave voyages and the British trade in slave-
produced goods - together accounted for 63 per cent of premiums earned by the British 
marine insurance industry (see table 1.1 column D). Thus, the slave trade and its related 
transatlantic commodity trades appear to have been hugely important to the growth of this 
key financial service. 
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  Inikori, Africans, pp. 338-61. As recently as 1999 Clark remarked that “it is unclear 
how frequently English merchants actually insured slaves on the Middle Passage”, Clark, 
Betting, p.17. 
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[Table 1 here] 
The contribution of the slave trade to British economic development has been much 
debated. While some scholars are sceptical about its macroeconomic impact, arguing that the 
trade was small and profits precarious, others have pointed to the economic spin-offs and 
multiplier effects of capital accumulated from trade in slave-grown commodities circulating 
among British business networks during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
49
 
Slave traders were prominent investors, for instance, in the early London dock companies, 
but they were not necessarily a dominating presence in the City. According to Draper, 
planters‟ bills formed an important part of London finance, but, contrary to Inikori, they did 
not comprise the bulk of bills in circulation in London and provinces. In the same vein, 
Draper has also questioned Inikori‟s argument that slavery-related trades dominated marine 
insurance. He estimates, from data of the London Assurance Corporation for 1769-70, that 15 
per cent of sums insured on marine insurance policies and one-third of premiums derived 
from African and West Indian trades at that time, levels well below those estimated by Inikori 
for the 1790s.
50
 
As explained in our notes to table 1, Inikori's estimates were based on projecting total 
British marine insurance premiums backwards from John Julius Angerstein's figure of 
£10.95m in 1809, given in his evidence to the Select Committee on Marine Insurance.
51
 
Inikori took the ratio of premiums earned by London Assurance in 1809 to its average 
                                                          
49
  Eltis and Engerman, “Importance”; Zahadieh, “Overseas Trade”, p.403; Pearson, 
“Collective”; Pearson and Richardson, “Networking”; Devine, Tobacco.  
50
  Draper, “City”.  
51
  Report from the Select Committee on Marine Insurance, British Parliamentary Papers 
(hereafter BPP), 1810, IV, 314-15. Angerstein was a former chairman of Lloyd‟s.  
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premiums for 1793-1807, and applied this ratio to Angerstein‟s figure to estimate average 
annual British marine insurance premiums for 1793-1807. He then employed the same 
method to estimate annual average total premiums for 1750-92 and 1720-50.  
There are several problems with this back-projection method. First, Inikori obtained 
only approximate figures for London Assurance from a graph by A.H. John.
52
 Supple 
calculated more accurate average premiums for London Assurance from the annual data in 
the company records, and we have used these for our estimates.
53
 Second, Inikori ignored the 
marine business of the other insurance corporation, the Royal Exchange Assurance, which by 
the 1770s was over twice as large as that of London Assurance. The accuracy of Inikori‟s 
method partly depends upon the smaller insurer adequately representing the growth of British 
marine insurance. Our estimates, by contrast, utilise the combined premiums of both 
corporations, as given by Supple.
54
  
Third, Angerstein derived his estimate of £10.95m premiums in 1809 by applying a 
rate of 7.5 per cent - the “average rate of premiums for the last 22 years…” - to the amount 
insured by the corporations and by private underwriters in London, as calculated from returns 
of stamp duty in 1809, plus an estimate for the amount insured in London on the British 
coasting trade.
55
 This, however, ignored British marine insurance written outside London. 
                                                          
52
  John, “London Assurance”, p.130. 
53
  Supple, Royal Exchange, p.61n2.  
54
  Supple gives the average premiums of London Assurance net of returns. We have 
increased these by 25 per cent to obtain gross premiums comparable with those of Royal 
Exchange Assurance. According to Supple, returns in the period 1796-1815 “averaged just 
over 25 per cent of gross premiums”. Supple, Royal Exchange, p.62, table 3.1n.   
55
  BPP, 1810, IV, 314-15. 
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The Select Committee itself made an allowance for the latter and estimated the total sum 
insured to be £162.5m, compared to Angerstein‟s £140.5m. Applying the rate of 7.5 per cent 
to £162.5m gives a total of £12.19m for marine insurance premiums in 1809. Another 
member of Lloyd‟s, Joseph Marryat, thought that the Select Committee had underestimated 
the amount written outside London, and he calculated total insured on marine policies to be 
£175.6m.
56
 Applying 7.5 per cent to this gives an upper bound of £13.2m premiums in 1809 
(upper bound, because the average rate on Irish and coasting trades would have been lower 
than 7.5 per cent, which was more representative of the premium rate on foreign trade). 
Furthermore, when the percentage stamp tax on marine insurance was introduced in 1795, 
Pitt estimated its yield based on a figure of £104m insured.
57
 At a rate of 7.5 per cent, this 
suggests £7.8m marine insurance premiums in that year. In short, taking all the above 
calculations into account, Inikori‟s annual average of £4m premiums in 1793-1807, back-
projected from Angerstein‟s figure of 1809, is almost certainly too low, probably by at least 
50 per cent. The result, we argue, is to overstate the importance of slaving and slave trade 
related insurance to British marine insurance in the 1790s and 1800s.  
Our new estimates, shown in table 1, are based on the combined premiums of both 
corporations 1760-1810 and the annual duty paid on marine insurance 1800-1809. We have 
used these two components to derive decennial averages of British marine insurance 
premiums, 1760-1809, and the share in these of Inikori's estimated premiums earned on slave 
and West Indian trades. To do this, we calculate the combined stamp duty paid by the two 
corporations 1800-09 as a percentage of the total duty paid, and then multiply the combined 
premiums of the corporations by that percentage in order to obtain the total premiums earned 
                                                          
56
  Marryat, Observations, p.289. Marryat became chairman of Lloyd‟s 1811-24. 
57
  Raynes, History, p.189. 
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from British marine insurance in that decade. The same multiplier method - applying the 
market shares of the corporations to their actual premiums - is used to estimate total marine 
insurance premiums for the decades between 1760 and 1800. For this period, however, the 
corporation market shares are estimates based on several assumptions, explained in the notes 
to table 1, about the growth of marine insurance before 1800.   
Our new estimates suggest that seven per cent of British marine insurance in the 
1790s was accounted for by slaving voyages alone, while the slave and West India trades 
combined accounted for 41 per cent, well below Inikori‟s figure of 63 per cent for 1793-
1807. Nevertheless, if not accounting for the great majority of the British marine insurance 
industry as Inikori claimed, the “Atlantic slave economy” still represented a sizeable portion 
by the end of the eighteenth century. Moreover, comparing our figure of 41 per cent with 
Draper‟s estimate of 33 per cent in 1769/70 suggests that the transatlantic slave trade and its 
related commodity trades may have increased somewhat in importance to British marine 
insurance during the final three decades of the eighteenth century, though this was probably 
not a linear trend as high wartime premiums were offset by reduced volumes of traffic (see 
Table 2).
58
   
[Table 2 here] 
 
                                                          
58
  Our estimates, however, may be regarded as upper bound. If the figure of £7.8m total 
marine insurance premiums in 1795, discussed above, is accurate, premiums earned from 
insuring the slave trade would have accounted for only five per cent (0.41/7.8), and those 
from the slave and West India trades together 32 per cent (2.52/7.8), of the total in the mid-
1790s. Thus, taking Draper‟s estimate as a base, slave trade insurance would have grown at 
about the same rate since 1770 as British marine insurance as a whole.  
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THE UNDERWRITING OF SLAVE VOYAGES 
Risk distribution and under-insurance 
Owners of slave ships and their cargoes obtained insurance either indirectly through 
brokers or by directly contracting with an underwriter, who was often a fellow merchant. For 
voyages fitted out in London, the former method may have been important, though without a 
study of the way that London slave traders insured we remain unsure. It is likely that their 
access to insurance became easier during the late eighteenth century, as the activities of 
Lloyds brokers and underwriters became more differentiated and capacity there increased. By 
1810 there were up to 1500 subscribers to Lloyds, of whom two-thirds were regular or 
occasional underwriters.
59
  
In the provincial ports the second method of insuring prevailed, with local slave 
merchants in Bristol and Liverpool commonly acting as underwriters for each other‟s 
voyages. Given the importance of local business networks, it is not surprising that the pattern 
of underwriting seems to have mirrored the well known ownership structure of the trade in 
these ports, whereby a few large and closely connected firms dominated the business, 
accompanied by a greater number of small firms fitting out a minority of ventures.
60
  We 
                                                          
59
  There had been just 179 subscribers in 1775. Wright and Fayle, History, p. 218; 
Kingston, “Marine Insurance”, 389. 
60
  Of 359 Liverpool firms fitting out 878 „Guinea‟ ships between 1783 and 1793, just 10 
accounted for 502 of these ships. In 1789-91 the four largest firms in London and Bristol 
employed respectively 61 per cent and 93 per cent of the entire tonnage in their port‟s slave 
trade. Inikori, “Market Structure”, tables 1, 3. For similar accounts of ownership 
concentration in the British trade, see Anstey, Atlantic Slave Trade 1992, pp. 6-7; 
Richardson, “Profits”, p. 68. On Liverpool networks, see Pearson and Richardson, “Business 
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have analysed the distribution of insurance in 27 policies insuring £83,150 on 15 ships and 
cargoes undertaking six voyages from Bristol between 1784 and 1793. On 19 of these 
policies, James Rogers was the lead underwriter, insuring 29.3 per cent of the total. A further 
eight underwriters, including the closest partners of Rogers, wrote another 34 per cent of the 
total. Together these nine men wrote 64 per cent of the amount insured on these 27 policies. 
There was, however, a long tail of 54 others writing small sums - £50, £100, £200 - on either 
the ships or cargoes or both. By insuring each other‟s voyages, Bristol merchants saved five 
per cent on brokers‟ fees, while their business contacts and partnerships across the city and 
region doubtless mitigated the costs involved in finding insurance themselves. The data 
suggest the general capacity of the major provincial ports to provide sufficient cover for most 
of their own slaving voyages without significant resort to the London insurance market. 
Whether or not there was differential access to insurance cover among slave trading firms, 
leading to the kinds of market distortions that Dalton & Leung have recently investigated, is 
impossible to say. As yet we know nothing about the dispersion, if any, of premium rates and 
insurance cover among firms of different sizes operating out of British ports. The greater 
productivity of the British trade compared to those of France and Portugal, however, suggests 
that such distortions in British insurance markets were relatively minor.
61
 
Slaving voyages often required multiple policies, especially when goods were added 
to the cargo after the original policy had been issued, either before sailing or at different ports 
on the voyage.  On the Rogers voyages sometimes these additional policies were written 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Networking”. Ownership structures in the French slave trade were also highly concentrated. 
Stein, French Slave Trade, 152-5; Viles, “Slaving Interest”, 535-6. 
61
  Dalton and Leung, “Dispersion and Distortions”. We are indebted to an anonymous 
referee for drawing our attention to this reference.  
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outside Bristol, mainly in Liverpool and London but also in Exeter. It was common, 
therefore, for policies to be written at different times before and during a voyage. On the 
African Queen, for instance, which departed Bristol in January 1792 and returned in May 
1793, policies totalling £20,400 were issued on ship and goods in December 1791, February 
1792 and May 1792.
62
  
 As planters‟ payments for slaves in the Americas by the late eighteenth century were 
largely made in post-dated bills, merchants tended to insure their shares in total outlays to 
Africa and America only. Insurance on the ship on the return run, and on the small quantities 
of produce brought home from America, were often underwritten separately at a later date. Of 
the 330 policies listed in Abraham Clibborn‟s underwriting books for 1769-75, 227 combined 
the outward run to Africa and the middle passage in one insurance. Our data, however, also 
show that all segments of the triangular trade could be individually insured, as well as the 
direct trade to the West Indies, and direct voyages to and from Africa.  
Establishing the extent to which the full values of ship, outfit and cargo were covered 
by insurance is more difficult. The business accounts that have survived do not always enable 
us to be sure that they include all the insurance issued for the voyage. As noted above, 
policies might be issued intermittently and by different underwriters in different places before 
and during a voyage. Far more so than fixed capital on land, the “replacement value” of a 
ship and cargo en route could change not only between different segments of a journey, but 
also within the same segment. Historians have carried out considerable research on the outlay 
costs (ship, outfit and goods) of slave voyages, and, as discussed below, we know that 
insurance amounted to, on average, about 10 per cent of these costs in the British trade during 
                                                          
62
  TNA, C107/1-15, James Rogers Papers. I wonder if I should dig out more specific 
references, at least in terms of box numbers?   
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the second half of the eighteenth century, but this does not tell us how often ships and their 
outfit and cargo were fully insured.  
What can be said at present is that it is unlikely there was any systematic 
underinsurance in the maritime industry, especially in the slave trade where owners were 
often among the underwriters of their own ships and cargoes. British insurance companies did 
systematically limit insurance on property on land against damage by fire to 75 per cent of its 
replacement value, as a device to compel the insured to carry one quarter of the liability.
63
 
However, the widespread presence of self-insurance in slaving voyages must have greatly 
alleviated the moral hazard problem in this business, especially as many of the other 
underwriters were partners of the owners or belonged to their wider business network. 
Owners of slaving voyages did not always seek full coverage. Writing to James 
Rogers from Tortola in 1788, William Grumly reported on the sloop Lion: 
 
I think there is no occasion for making an insurance on the sloop‟s cargo. She is a fine vessel, sails fast and [it 
is] summer time. Will be ready for sea 22 May, sail within 7-10 days. I am sorry I could not get her away before 
but such short crops. Every person here is pushed to get a freight and some vessels that has been here four or 
five months has not on board 50 hogsheads sugar. 
64
 
 
In short, a light cargo and a fast ship sailing in the summer induced the captain to avoid 
insuring the return leg to England. The Select Committee on Marine Insurance estimated in 
1809 that 49 per cent of all insurable property at sea (£158m out of £320m) was not covered 
by insurance. 
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  Pearson, Insuring, pp.309-12. 
64
  TNA, C107/8, James Rogers Papers, William Grumly to James Rogers, 21 May 1788. 
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Risk assessment and rates  
What did underwriters take into account when assessing the risk of insuring a slaving 
voyage? From 1764 the key information for London underwriters was listed in Lloyd’s 
Register, which itself was probably compiled from the private registers of Lloyd‟s members. 
This fell into three categories: data about the owner, master and crew; the route (port and 
destination); and the ship (tonnage, hull, number of decks, guns, construction history, 
condition).
65
 It is clear from our dataset that the two principal factors determining Bristol 
rates were the route and the time of sailing, particularly whether in peace or war. Table 3 
presents average premium rates - measured as £ premiums per £100 insured (£%) - from 
three different but consistent sources: the rates given by Inikori and those we have calculated 
from Abraham Clibborn‟s underwriting books and the accounts of James Rogers. All three 
sources show that average rates varied between different segments of the triangular voyage. 
Between the 1770s and 1790s premium rates for the middle passage (column 2 in table 3A, 
row 2 in tables 3B and 3C) were higher than the other two segments, though not much higher 
than those charged for the return journey from the Americas (column 3 in table 3A, row 3 in 
tables 3B and 3C). During wartime, with the increased risk of enemy privateers, the home 
voyage eastward attracted the highest rates (column 3 in table 3A, row 3 in table 3C).  
[Table 3 here] 
Perhaps surprisingly, however, these differences in rates did not reflect the “actuarial” 
risk of losses at sea. Table 4 shows that in the period after 1760 more British slave ships were 
lost on the first and third segments of the triangular route than in the middle passage, and also 
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  Wright and Fayle, History, p.86. 
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that this pattern holds true for the transatlantic slave trade more generally. Why then were 
rates higher on the middle passage? As noted above and discussed further below, 
underwriters did not cover the “natural mortality” of slaves on board ships. Only the loss of 
slaves who died during shipboard insurrections, subject to an excess of 10 per cent, or of 
slaves that were jettisoned to save a ship from storms or shipwreck or other „perils of the sea‟ 
could be insured, and both were fairly exceptional events (see below). Thus, slave mortality 
in the middle passage cannot explain the differential in premium rates. If premium rates for 
the middle passage had been determined solely by the risk of the wreck or destruction of the 
ship - our best approximation of the “actuarially fair” rate given the absence of data on other 
major insurable „perils of the sea‟ - then the policyholders in our Clibborn-Rogers dataset 
would have been charged for the middle passage between one quarter to one-third of the 
premium rates that they actually paid.
66
  
                                                          
66
  In this calculation we have applied the ratios of British slave ships wrecked on the 
middle passage to those wrecked on the outward (2.14) and return (2.88) legs respectively to 
the actual average premium rates for the outward and return legs charged on the Clibborn and 
Rogers voyages (the latter excluding the wartime year of 1793) as show in table 3. For 
example, the average rate for the outward leg in the Clibborn policies is £2.3 (Table 3B row 
1). This figure, divided by the ratio of shipwrecks on the middle passage to those on the 
outward leg (2.3/2.14), gives an actuarially fair premium rate for the middle passage of £1.1. 
Applying the ratio of middle passage shipwrecks to those on the return leg to the Clibborn 
premium rate (Table 3B row 3) for the return leg (4.3/2.88) gives an actuarially fair middle 
passage premium rate of £1.5. Clibborn policies thus would have paid between £1.1 and £1.5, 
or just 22 per cent to 31 per cent of the rate £4.8 that was actually charged (Table 3B, row 2). 
Using the same method, the actuarially fair middle passage rates for the Rogers voyages 
26 
 
[Table 4 here] 
This finding does not mean that underwriters were necessarily irrational when pricing 
insurance for a slaving voyage. They may have imposed a higher rate for ships on the middle 
passage because they regarded all cross-risks as inherently riskier than voyages to and from 
England, although we know of no evidence that this was the case. More probably, they may 
have factored in a notional premium for the uncertainty of a ship on the high seas being 
endangered by carrying live, rather than inanimate, cargoes. Livestock such as horses or 
cattle could stampede in a storm or carry contagious diseases in the same way that slaves 
might resist control or fatally infect the crew, imperilling the safety of the ship and its 
navigation. Although the incidence of such events was probably well known, underwriters 
would have found it difficult accurately to predict at the outset whether the security and 
hygiene measures on any given voyage were sufficient to mitigate these risks fully. Similarly, 
the navigation hazards of the middle passage were well understood - the need to pick up the 
north east trade winds, the difficulty of passing through the equatorial doldrums without 
being becalmed for an uncertain and dangerous length of time, mid-ocean storms blowing a 
ship off course, the risk of tropical storms near the West Indies, the huge variation in crossing 
times.
67
 Yet it would have been difficult to price these hazards for individual ships with any 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1784-92 would have been between £1.1 and £1.4, or 28 to 34 per cent of the actual average 
rate of £4. Average premium rates, as elsewhere in this paper, are given as £ per £100 
insured. 
67
  Ships leaving Senegambia could move directly into the northeast trade winds, but 
from the 1760s Bristol and Liverpool ships traded principally from Sierra Leone to the Bight 
of Biafra and beyond. Morgan, “Liverpool‟s Dominance”, table 1.2. This part of the coast 
had prevailing westerlies and a strong eastward current. The route to the West Indies 
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degree of certainty, notwithstanding good information about the captain‟s expertise and the 
seaworthiness of the vessel.   
Another possible explanation for the relatively high premiums for the middle passage 
may be that ships on this leg were more exposed to capture. In wartime, shipping losses rose 
and rates on most categories of marine insurance doubled, although there were substantial 
discounts or rebates if ships joined armed convoys.
68
 Convoy protection, however, was not 
available for the middle passage, but only for direct routes between Britain and the West 
Indies and back, as enemy privateers mainly hunted ships sailing outward through the Bristol 
and English channels or returning from the Americas. Moreover, it was easier for direct 
traders to get convoys because their schedules were more predictable. By contrast, slave 
voyages were timed to arrive in Africa in the dry season, which varied by coastal trading 
location, and, once their cargoes were sold in the Americas, they aimed to clear out for home 
as soon as possible in order to refit for Africa, without necessarily waiting for a convoy.
69
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
commonly involved sailing south to the Equator to pick up the southeast trades, then turning 
north in mid-ocean to cross the doldrums for a second time to catch the northeast trades. 
Curtin, Atlantic Slave Trade, pp. 278-9. For large deviations from mean crossing times, see 
Postma, Dutch Slave Trade, p. 162; Stein, French Slave Trade, p.97. For the argument that 
Lloyd‟s underwriters were well informed about Atlantic navigation risks, see Leonard, 
“Contingent”, p.52; Kingston, “Marine Insurance”. 
68
  Wright and Fayle, History, p.158. 
69
  Eltis, Lewis, and Richardson, “Slave Prices”; Behrendt, “Merchants”. On the more 
concentrated seasonal voyage patterns in the direct trade to the West Indies, see Davis 
Shipping Industry, pp.279-80. 
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As table 5 shows, marine underwriters charged large price differentials in summer and 
winter for some, though not all, routes in other trades, but these played little role in slave 
trade insurance. Most slave voyages departed from England to avoid the rainy season in 
Africa, and left the Caribbean before the onset of the hurricane season in August.
70
 The 
repeated advice of West Indian factors to owners was to have slave cargoes arrive at market 
just prior to or at the start of the sugar harvest, when demand for newly imported slaves was 
highest and when planters were most likely to agree to shorter terms on their bills, subject, of 
course, to the state of that year‟s crop.71  
[Table 5 here] 
Information about the ship, its master and crew, and the quality and value of its cargo, 
at least on the outward route to Africa, was of less significance in Bristol than route and 
timing, given that so many local underwriters were part-insurers of their own ships or those 
of their business partners and neighbors. To that extent, provincial underwriters may have 
had information advantages over their counterparts at Lloyd‟s when assessing risks, though it 
is still unclear whether this was reflected in differential rates.  
Generally, slaves were included in the general rate for the ship and/or cargo. Some, 
though not all, policies specified “negroes at £30 per head”, increasing to £40 in the war 
years of the 1790s. This standard price seems to have been set in some relation to the 
expected average sale price of a “prime adult male” in the West Indies. Cargoes loaded on the 
African coast, of course, comprised a mixture of slaves by gender, height, age, and ethnicity, 
factors that, together with the condition of the slaves upon arrival at market, and the state of 
supply, demand and planters‟ credit requirements, would determine the average price 
                                                          
70
  Davis, Rise, pp. 277-82, 292-7; Behrendt, “Merchants”; Behrendt, “Ecology.” 
71
  Radburn, “Keeping.” 
29 
 
achieved by a ship‟s cargo. None of this could be known with any certainty at the outset of a 
voyage. In fact, the per capita insured value of slave cargoes appears, in general, to have been 
somewhat below the prices achieved in the 1780s by factors in the West Indies.  
Both in peace and war, slaving insurance rates tended to be at the higher end of the 
scale charged by marine underwriters on British foreign trades. Yet as tables 3 and 5 
demonstrate, they were by no means the highest. Slaving voyages, therefore, from the point 
of view of underwriters, were not extraordinarily risky. The relatively high premiums applied 
to the large cargoes, however, did amount to a significant cost burden for owners. Richardson 
and Inikori, separately, have estimated the proportion of outlay costs accounted for by 
insurance premiums. The figure for 74 voyages out of Liverpool, 1757-84, was 8.6 per cent, 
and for 60 „African ventures‟ 1757-1806 it was 9.8 per cent. Thus during the second half of 
the eighteenth century insurance premiums amounted to nearly 10 per cent of outward 
voyage costs. The ratio must have been even higher during wartime.
72
 As Richardson has 
pointed out, this must have had an important effect on slavers‟ profits margins, though 
account must be taken of the fact that merchants were often paying some of the premiums to 
themselves as underwriters.
73
 Whether insurance amounted to a higher cost burden than in 
other trades remains an open question, owing to the lack of evidence on premium payments 
as a proportion of outlay costs in the latter. As tables 3b and 3c indicate, the higher premium 
rates on the middle passage inflated the cost of insurance for slave traders, at least in 
peacetime, while rates on the other two legs of the slaving voyage were more aligned with 
standard bilateral voyage rates in the direct trade. It may be the case that the larger crews on 
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  Richardson, “Profits”, appendix; Inikori, Africans, appendix 7.2. 
73
  Richardson, “Profits”, p.74. 
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slave voyages compounded the impact of insurance on total costs.
74
 However their impact is 
is uncertain, for even if slaving was more labor intensive, ship-owners tried to mitigate these 
costs by discharging “surplus” crew at the earliest possible opportunity. As Richardson has 
shown, crew per ton ratios were much higher on outward slave voyages from Bristol and 
Liverpool in the late eighteenth century than for the homeward leg to England.
75
 Manning 
rates of slave ships on their outward journey involved an element of risk management, 
reflecting the need for crew to oversee the slaves as well as navigate the ship and the fact 
that, due to exposure to tropical disease and other factors, slave ship crews experienced 
exceptionally high rates of mortality, with many failing to reach the Americas. Evidence from 
muster rolls, however, shows that, despite such losses it was still commonplace for masters to 
discharge some crew in the colonies, retaining a skeleton crew to sail the ship home. 
Economies could be achieved therefore in the monthly wage bill of slave ships, but the 
human nature of their cargo meant that labor costs, like middle passage insurance charges, 
weighed heavily on the financial balance sheet of slaving voyages.  
 
What did insurance cover and not cover? 
As we have seen, slaving voyages were insured on the standard Lloyd‟s policy form (or its 
Bristol and Liverpool counterparts), which listed the usual “perils of the sea”.76 Ships and 
cargoes were covered from departure in England to arrival on the African coast, usually - not 
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  Behrendt, “Human Capital”. Our thanks to an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
75
  Richardson, “Costs of Survival”, p.190. It should be noted, however, that recent 
research has questioned the consistency of tonnage measurements in the trade. Solar and 
Duquette, “Ship Crowding”.    
76
  See note 19 above. 
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always - with the destination left unspecified, and up to 24 hours after safely beginning 
trading there. In the majority of policies cover then resumed from Africa to the Americas, 
again usually with destination ports left unspecified, to give the captain the opportunity to sail 
between islands looking for the best market. Excluded was the underwriters‟ liability for any 
lack of seaworthiness of the vessel at time of departure
77
; losses while trading or transporting 
slaves in boats on the African coast and in rivers - though this was not always specified; 
worm damage to hulls due to delays in sailing from tropical rivers - some policies, though not 
all, required hulls to be copper sheathed as a condition of insurance; and the “natural deaths” 
of slaves. The latter was normally left unspecified in the policy contract. It is clear, however, 
from their everyday business accounts that underwriters and merchants commonly 
understood it to mean any slave deaths on board from illness, beatings or torture, suicide or 
fasting to death, and that they took it to be the equivalent of the standard exemption from 
liability for the ordinary spoilage, wastage, leakage or poor handling and storage of other 
perishable goods such as corn, fish, salt, fruit, flour and seed. These were commonly 
warranted “free from particular average”, by which their particular value could not be 
claimed for unless it was included in any general claim for loss or damage to ship and cargo 
on which all insurers would pay in proportion to the sums they had individually written. We 
have found no actuarial calculation by underwriters of the “natural mortality” of slaves on 
slaving voyages. There was a lot of discussion in the business records between owners, 
captains and factors about mortality on individual ships, but this was only ever in relation to 
what was deemed to be a “paying voyage”.  
As noted above, underwriters were also commonly exempt from liability for any loss 
or damage to the ship and cargo caused by slave revolt up to ten, or sometimes five, per cent 
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  This was confirmed by a court ruling of 1764, Wright and Fayle, History, p.148. 
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of the net outlay value of the ship and cargo. Any losses above that level would be paid for 
under general average. On a £6000 policy, assuming this covered the full value of the outlay, 
at £30 per head a minimum of 20 slaves would have to die directly in a shipboard revolt 
before underwriters would begin to pay for losses.
 78
  
This was a hefty “excess” for owners to carry.79 The ten per cent insurrection 
exemption clause was intended to reduce the moral hazard of the wilful murder of slaves on 
board, to encourage owners and captains to take proper safety precautions in controlling and 
preserving the value of these and other perishable cargoes, and to remove the opportunity for 
small and vexatious claims for losses at sea due to negligence. Taken together, these 
exclusions, plus the other devices to mitigate moral hazard, such as “privilege” slaves for 
masters and chief officers and “head” money for surgeons (enhanced by the bonuses paid to 
them for low shipboard mortality rates under the 1788 Dolben Act), made the underwriting of 
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  Cf. the £6000 policy on the Bristol slaver Daniel in 1792, TNA, C107/11, James 
Rogers Papers, Inset notes for the Swift, Henry Laroche, Africa to Grenada.  
79
  It has been estimated that one in 10 slaving voyages experienced a revolt of some 
kind, with an average of 25 slave deaths per revolt. But this average was heavily skewed by a 
small number of revolts with catastrophic mortality. The median number of deaths was less 
than half the mean, and 37 per cent of revolts resulted in five or fewer slave deaths. Behrendt, 
Eltis and Richardson, “Costs of Coercion”, 461-4. In the later eighteenth century only the 
smallest British voyages, with total outlays of £4000 or less, at a £30 per head valuation and 
experiencing the median number of shipboard revolt deaths, would have reached the excess 
(in this case 13 deaths) above which underwriters were liable. The average outlay on Bristol 
voyages in 1790 was £8,500. Richardson, Bristol, pp. xvii-xviii.  
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slave voyages a far less precarious business than it otherwise might have been.
80
 This helps to 
explain the relatively moderate rates charged in comparison, for example with the East Indian 
trade, or with northern European routes during wartime.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The primary conclusion about insuring transatlantic slave voyages from the perspective of 
underwriters, brokers and merchants is that it was a generally unexceptional business.  
Premium rates were not astronomically high compared to other trades, especially during 
wartime. Premiums were not strictly actuarial in the sense that they did not reflect the real 
loss frequency of slave shipping on the different segments of the triangular trade, but the 
same was probably true for the insurance of all other types of cargo. Average slave ship 
losses and captures over the period 1760-1807 were not exceptionally high, especially in the 
middle passage. The proportion of British ships lost (gross of recaptures) was 7.7 per cent in 
1793-1801, and 9.5 per cent in the worst years of the American war 1779-82.
81
 With a loss 
rate of 6.5 per cent between 1760 and 1810, a period covering war and peace, British slaving 
voyages were no more risky than general foreign trades during war years. In fact, as we have 
seen, more British slave ships were lost on the legs of the triangular route without slave 
cargoes than with. 
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  The Dolben Act stipulated bonuses for masters and surgeons on vessels achieving 
mortality rates below three per cent. It has been argued, however, that this had little effect on 
overall slave mortality which was 5.7 per cent between 1791 and 1797. Klein and Engerman, 
“Slave Mortality”. 
81
  Calculated from Wright and Fayle, History, pp.156-7, 451-5. 
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The process of underwriting slaves differed little in practice from that of other maritime 
trades. Levels of self-insurance, though perhaps not under-insurance, may have been rather 
higher than in other trades, but the contracts were standard. Slaves were insured in policies 
alongside a wide range of other commodities traded across oceans, such as textiles, guns, 
hardware, beads, and a variety of raw materials. The extent to which cargoes and ships were 
monitored, and the exemptions from liability built into policies, point to the trade being 
relatively safe, and probably profitable, for insurers over time, not least because the latter 
concentrated on covering the standard perils of the seas, while the slave merchants 
themselves had to find ways of mitigating or managing most of the perils associated with 
their human cargoes.  
The agency of slaves in taking decisions over their lives through suicide, jumping 
overboard, shipboard revolt, and fasting to death resulted in a marginally greater number of 
exemptions from liability being built into insurance contracts than in other maritime trades, 
but that was only a difference of degree not substance. Among those directly involved in the 
trade slaves were commonly regarded as animate and perishable goods, and no more than 
that. Even where the welfare of slaves - their diet, quality of provisions, medical treatment - 
was critically remarked upon by traders, factors and masters in private business 
correspondence, it was only ever in the context of protecting the value of an asset, with a 
view to achieving a high average price at sale.
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  A typical example is TNA, C107/13, James Rogers Papers, Wm Woodville jr. to 
James Rogers, Bannee [Bonny], 16 May 1791.  
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Table 1: Estimating British marine insurance 
1.1. Inikori‟s estimates 
 A B C D 
 Average annual 
premiums (£), 
London 
Assurance 
Average annual 
premiums (£m), 
British marine 
insurance 
Average annual 
premiums (£m), 
Slave and West 
Indian trades  
C as % of B 
1720-50 35,000 1.80   
1750-92 38,000 2.00   
1793-1807 76,000 4.00 2.52 63.0 
1809 228,000 10.95   
 
Sources and Notes: Column A: Inikori, Africans, p.342n87. Inikori's figures derive from the 
graph in John, “London Assurance”, p.130. Inikori states that the average for 1793-1807 was 
“roughly twice” that for 1750-92, and the figure for 1809 was “roughly three times” the 
average of 1793-1807; Column B: The figure for 1809 is given in Angerstein‟s evidence to 
the Select Committee on Marine Insurance, BPP 1810, IV, 314-15. As explained in Inikori, 
Africans, p.342n88, the other figures are the product of the ratios between the average 
premiums of London Assurance for the different periods. Thus, as its premiums in 1793-1807 
were one third (not three times as stated in Inikori, Africans, p.342n88) of those in 1809, the 
annual average premiums for UK marine insurance 1793-1807 are “put at approximately 
£4m”. London Assurance‟s average premiums in 1750-92 were half those in 1793-1807, so 
the UK average for 1750-92 is £2m. Inikori states that “the figure for 1720-50 is a marginal 
adjustment arising from the closeness of the company's premium earnings in 1750-92 and 
1720-50”; Column C: Inikori, Africans, p.356. Inikori estimates premiums of £2.52m from 
the slave and West Indian trades by applying average premium rates to his estimates of the 
value of these trades (ships, outfit, goods, slaves). £2.52m relates to the period 1791-1800, 
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but is applied by Inikori to his estimate of total marine insurance for 1793-1807 to produce 
the percentage in column D.  
   
1.2. New estimates 
   Average annual premiums £m   
 A B C D E   
 Corporations‟ 
combined 
premiums –  
average £ p.a. 
Corporations‟ 
combined 
share % 
Total UK 
marine 
insurance  
Slave 
trade 
only 
Slave & 
WI 
trades 
D as % 
of C 
E as % 
of C 
1760/1-
1769/70 
69,649 5.0 1.39 0.11  7.9  
1770/1-
1779-80 
73,298 4.5 1.63 0.08  4.9  
1780/1-
1789/90 
135,600 5.0 2.71 0.11  4.1  
1790/1-
1799/00 
280,451 4.5 6.23 0.41 2.52 6.6 40.5 
1800/1-
1809/10 
263,125 3.89 6.76 0.53  7.8  
1809  3.79 10.95     
 
Sources and Notes: Column A: Supple, Royal Exchange, p.61n2 and table 3.1.We have raised 
London Assurance's net premiums (net of returns) by 25 per cent to estimate gross premiums, 
following the note in Supple‟s table 3.1, and added them to those of Royal Exchange 
Assurance; Column B: The percentage figure for 1809 is the two corporations‟ combined 
insurance (£6,155,755) as a share of total UK marine insurance (£162,538,900), as estimated 
by the Select Committee, BPP 1810, IV, 250, from company returns and from stamp duty 
collected on marine insurance policies that year. The figure for 1800/1-1809/10 is the 
corporations‟ combined share of stamp duty paid on policies 1800-09. This probably 
overstates the corporations‟ share (and therefore understates total UK marine insurance) 
because of widespread evasion of duty by private underwriters before 1808. See Marryat, 
Observations, p.289. Percentages for 1760-1800 are estimates based on the following 
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assumptions: (i) that the corporations‟ share of total duty paid in 1800 (£5,355 out of 
£113,442, or 4.7 per cent) approximates the corporations‟ market share in 1790-99, once 
adjusted downwards (to 4.5 per cent) to allow for some evasion of the stamp duty by private 
underwriters;  (ii) that the two corporations kept pace with Lloyd‟s through to 1790; (iii) that 
their market share was lower during wartime years due to more conservative underwriting, 
their refusal to insure cross-risks, their higher rates, stricter policy conditions, and the 
accelerated growth of Lloyds after 1793. See Kingston, “Marine Insurance”. Column C: The 
figure for 1809 is Angerstein's estimate. All other UK marine insurance premiums are 
estimated by multiplying up the corporations' combined premiums by the market shares given 
in column B. Columns C and D: the premium estimates given by Inikori, Africans, tables 7.3 
and 7.6. 
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Table 2. Total slave arrivals in the Caribbean (5 year totals)  
1756-60 (war) 101,449 
1761-5 (war and peace) 164,311 
1766-70 (peace) 245,938 
1771-5 (peace) 264,900 
1776-80 (war) 140,535 
1781-5 (war and peace) 189,971 
1786-90 (peace) 307,060 
 
Source: Eltis, Lewis, and Richardson, “Slave Prices”, table 4, p.691. 
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Table 3: Insurance rates for British slaving voyages (£%) 
(A) Inikori‟s rates 
 1 2 3 
 England to Africa Africa to Americas Americas to England 
1701-13 4.0 8.0 10.0 
1714-38 2.0 4.5 4.5 
1739-48 4.0 8.0 10.0 
1749-55 2.0 4.5 4.5 
1756-62 6.0 10.0 10.0 
1763-75 2.0 4.5 4.5 
1776-82 5.0 10.0 10.0 
1783-92 2.0 4.5 4.5 
1793-1807 8.0 12.0 14.0 
 
(B) Clibborn‟s rates, 1769-75 (N=330) 
  No of policies Average rate 
1 England to Africa 16 2.3 
2 Africa to America 46 4.8 
3 America to England 29 4.3 
4 England to Africa & America 227 6.6 
5 England to Africa & return 1 10.5 
6 America to Africa & return 1 8.4 
7 Time policies (no route) 10 6.2 
8 All policies 330 5.9 
 
(C) Rogers‟ rates, 1784-93 (N= 69) 
  1784-92 1793 
  No of 
policies 
Average 
rate 
No of 
policies 
Average 
rate 
1 England to Africa 18 2.4   
2 Africa to America 12 4.0 7 9.3 
3 America to England 6 3.9 6 13.5 
4 England to Africa & America 15 6.1   
5 Africa to England 3 3.3   
6 England to America 2 2.0   
7 All policies 56 4.5 13 10.8 
  
Notes: (1) All average rates are expressed as £ premiums paid per £100 insured, the standard 
metric used by contemporary insurers; (2) Inikori states his “rates represent a rather 
conservative average view of the differing rates in the sources cited” (p.350). He does not 
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state the number of policies on which his rates were calculated. (3) Rogers was declared 
bankrupt in 1793 and apparently insured no outward slaving voyages departing from England 
that year. 
Sources: (A): Rates as given in Inikori, Africans, table 7.2, p.350; (B): Calculated from 
amounts insured and premiums paid as given in TNA, C107/11, Underwriting books of 
Abraham Clibborn, 1768/9-1775; (C):  Calculated from amounts insured and premiums paid 
as given in TNA, C107/1-15, James Rogers Papers. 
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Table 4: Shipping losses in the transatlantic slave trade 
 All voyages 
1519-1867 
British voyages 
1760-1810 
 Number %  loss Number %  loss 
1.Total voyages 35,942  6,146  
2. Voyages with unknown 
outcome 
3,749               81  
3. Completed as intended 16,805  4,150  
4. Total ships wrecked/destroyed 1,013 3.1 397 6.5 
5. Ships wrecked/destroyed 
before slaving 
251  137  
6. Ships wrecked/destroyed while 
slaving 
249  64  
7. Ships wrecked/destroyed after 
slaves disembarked 
453  184  
8. Ships wrecked/destroyed – 
unspecified 
60  12  
 
Source: Based on  www.slavevoyages.org, accessed 1 May 2017. Search database/basic 
variables/all voyages and nation/flag/Great Britain, for line 1; basic variables/voyage 
outcome/outcome of voyage for owner, for line 2; general variables/voyage 
outcome/particular outcome of voyage/menu options „shipwreck‟, for all other lines.  
Note: percentage losses are computed by dividing totals in row 4 by the sum of voyages with 
known outcomes (i.e. row 1 less row 2). 
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Table 5: Non-slaving marine insurance rates: premium rates charged by London Assurance 
on voyages to and from London, 1768-70 (£%) 
 Summer Winter 
 Out Home Out Home 
Newcastle on Tyne  0.75  1.00 
Dublin  1.05 1.25 1.50 
Hamburg 1.00 1.00  2.00 
Bilbao 1.25 1.25 1.50 1.25 
Cadiz 1.05 1.05 1.25 1.25 
Smyrna 1.75 1.50 2.00 2.00 
North America 2.10 2.10 2.10 2.10 
Jamaica 2.50 4.20 2.50 4.20 
East Indies out and home 15.75*   
 
Sources and notes: John, “London Assurance”, table 2. * John notes that £8 of the East Indies 
premium was to be returned “if no hostilities in European waters”. All rates are shown as £ 
premiums paid per £100 insured (or £%).  
